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This paper assesses systemic linkages among banks in Hong Kong using the risk measure 
“CoVaR” derived from quantile regression. The CoVaR measure captures the 
co-movements of banks’ default risk by taking into account their nonlinear relationship 
when the banks are in distress. Based on equity price information, our estimation results 
show that the default risks of the banks were interdependent during the recent crisis. 
Although local banks are generally smaller, their systemic importance is found to be 
similar to their international and Mainland counterparts, which may be due to a higher 
degree of commonality in the risk profile of local banks. Regarding the impact of external 
shocks on the banks, international banks are more likely to be affected by the equity price 
fall in the US market, while local banks are relatively more responsive to funding liquidity 
risk. 
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Executive Summary: 
 
z  The global banking problem during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 highlights the 
importance of monitoring the interconnectivity among financial institutions and 
financial systems.  Such financial linkages can be assessed by estimating how the 
default risk of one financial institution affects the others using the information in 
their equity prices.   
 
z  This paper assesses the linkages among banks in Hong Kong using a CoVaR measure. 
The CoVaR methodology measures loss in extreme conditions and can be defined 
as  the expected maximum loss (at the 99th percentile) in a bank’s equity value 
(i.e. default risk), given that another bank’s equity value falls substantially (at the 
99th percentile). 
 
z  Empirical evidence suggests that, similar to other banking systems, there is 
significant risk interdependence among banks in Hong Kong.  More importantly, 
although local banks are generally smaller, their systemic importance measured by 
the CoVaR, is found to be similar to their international and Mainland counterparts, 
which may be due to a higher degree of commonality in the risk profile of local 
banks.  
 
z  Regarding the impact of external shocks on the banks, international banks are more 
likely to be affected by the equity price fall in the US market, while local banks are 
relatively more responsive to the risk factor of funding liquidity in the Hong Kong 
dollar. 
 
z  The study shows that the CoVaR is a useful indicator of the extent of risk 
interdependence among banks and identifying systemically important banks, which is 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  The global banking problem after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 demonstrates that default risks of financial institutions could be highly 
interdependent during times of financial crisis.  This high interdependence underlies the 
importance of monitoring the interconnectivity among financial institutions and financial 
systems in conducting financial market surveillance.    To extract the information on these 
financial linkages, many studies track the market perception, usually reflected in the 
equity prices of the financial institutions, of how the credit risk of one institution affects 
the others.  As the financial linkages across institutions move together strongly and 
increase more than proportionally with the surge in the level of risk of each institution 
during a distress period, it is critical to capture such nonlinearity in their co-movement 
when assessing the systemic risk in the financial market.
2  
 
  A quantile-regression analysis, which is a nonlinear methodology, models 
the nonlinear relationship among banks’ credit risk at a higher quantile after correcting for 
common aggregate risk factors (such as market volatility, interbank liquidity, etc.).    There 
are several advantages of using the quantile regression to capture this nonlinear 
relationship.    First, it gives a more accurate estimation of co-movement of risk measures 
amid rapidly fall in security prices and increasing risk of financial institutions during a 
distress period.  Secondly, by expressing the default risk of one bank as a function of 
another bank’s default risk and common aggregate risk factors, the quantile regression can 
separately assess endogenous risks (i.e. shocks from other financial institutions) and 
exogenous shocks (i.e. shocks from the common risk factors).  Thirdly, using a small 
sample in the quantile regression may also result in a better estimation of risk at a higher 
quantile because it uses all information available from the sample.
3 
 
  As part of the efforts to assess the systemic risk for the Hong Kong banking 
                                                 
2  In the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (April 2009), four different approaches including (i) the 
network approach, (ii) the co-risk model, (iii) the distress dependence matrix, and (iv) the default 
intensity model are mentioned. As discussed in the Report, each approach has its own merit and limitation 
but still they are an important set of tools that can provide the basis to address the spillover risk during the 
crisis. See details in IMF (2009a). Recent studies also discussed linkages of financial institutions, such as 
Bank of England (2009), IMF (2009b), Haldane (2009), and Brunnermeier et al. (2009). 
3  Another commonly used method in tail analysis is the extreme-value theory. This method may give a 
poor estimate of risk because it takes only the tail realisation and ignores the information content of a 
large portion of data sample in the estimation.   - 4 -
sector, this paper estimates the risk linkages among banks in Hong Kong using the 
quantile regression analysis on the basis of the information in equity prices of Hong Kong 
banks.
4  Intuitively, a bank with a sharp fall in its equity price at the 99
th percentile 
(i.e. a 1% probability of such extreme loss during the sample period) suggests that the 
bank may be in distress and has a high risk of default.  A CoVaR measure derived from 
the quantile regression (namely the CoVaR method in this paper) is a value-at-risk (VaR) 
measure of a bank conditional on another bank being under stress on its equity price. Such 
influence can directly come from other banks, or arise indirectly from exposures to 
common risk factors (such as interbank claims, reliance on wholesales markets for funding 
and feedback from market volatility due to holding similar assets, etc.).
5  By  estimating  a 
CoVaR for each pair of banks, a matrix of banks’ potential loss when other banks are under 
stress can be obtained. 
 
  As the Hong Kong banking sector is composed of both local and 
internationally active banks with different characteristics in terms of their market shares 
and business concentrations, we divide the banking sector into three bank groups: 
international banks, Mainland banks, and local banks to study their linkages in time of 
stress. Their CoVaR estimates help examine how default risks can spread from one bank 
group to another group and understand the extent of risk interdependence and systemic 
importance among banks.   
 
  The remaining parts of this paper are organised as follows. Section 2 
reviews briefly the literature regarding the CoVaR measure. Section 3 introduces the 
CoVaR method.  Data description is in Section 4. Section 5 discusses empirical results 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW IN THE COVAR METHOD 
 
 The  CoVaR measure derived from the quantile regression was first   
                                                 
4  In the literature, both credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity data are used to reflect banks’ default 
risk. As the CDS information is only available for a small number of banks in Hong Kong, this study uses 
equity prices for estimation of CoVaR. It is noted that inferring default risk from equity prices is used in 
credit risk modelling. For example, Merton (1974) develops a structure model in which the equity price, 
equity volatility and liability of a company are the determinants of its default risk. 
5  Details can be found in Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Chan-Lau (2008).     - 5 -
 
discussed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008).
6,7 Based on weekly market valued assets 
of 1,340 public financial institutions in the US
8, their study primarily focuses on marginal 
contribution of an institution to the overall systemic risk. Specifically, the CoVaR measure 
is defined as the VaR of a financial system conditional on the distress of a particular 
financial institution. In addition to using CoVaR measures to examine risk spillover, 
CoVaR can also be used to construct a countercyclical risk measure.  The idea is that, 
given a sufficiently large cross-section of panel data, CoVaRs of financial institutions at 
each cross-section can help determine which characteristics of the financial institutions 
(such as average maturity mismatch, leverage, market-to-book, size, etc.) contribute to 
systemic risk over time.  The panel regression coefficients can therefore be used to 
indicate how one should assign different weights to these characteristics in determining 
capital charge or tax imposed on different financial institutions. 
 
 While  the  CoVaR method in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) focuses on 
how much an institution adds to overall systemic risk, Chan-Lau (2008) uses the CoVaR 
method to study the spillover effects among 25 financial institutions across the US, Europe 
and Japan, based on their CDS spreads. The CoVaR is defined as the VaR of one institution 
conditional on another institution being at a particular VaR level. The study shows the 
extent of risk interdependence among the financial institutions in both normal and stressful 
periods. In addition, by comparing the average risk spillover (in terms of average CoVaR) 
of each institution to the others, the study also sheds light on identifying systemically 
important institutions. Similar to the framework in Chan-Lau (2008), IMF (2009a) adopts 
the CoVaR method to assess the systemic linkages (namely, the co-risk in the study) in the 
US banking sector. Using the CDS spreads of 13 major US financial institutions, the study 
shows that the CoVaR method can help identify which institutions had higher default risk 




                                                 
6  The quantile regression technique is first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). 
7  In their earlier work published in September 2008, they examined the spillover among the financial 
sectors including commercial banks, investment banks hedge fund and security broker dealer portfolio. 
8  It covers four financial sectors including commercial banks, investment banks and other security 




 We  define 
j
q VaR  as the maximum loss in equity return of bank j at a 
confidence level of (1 - q) over n days.  This unconditional loss can be statistically 
represented by  q VaR R
j
q
j = ≤ ) Pr( , where 




 The  measure  of  CoVaR, denoted by 
j i
q CoVaR
| , is defined as the VaR of 
bank i conditional on bank j at its level of 
j
q VaR . Statistically, it can be specified as: 
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To estimate this conditional risk, a quantile regression is used to relate the equity return of 
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where 
SPF R is the n-day return of the S&P 500 Financials Index to proxy the US stock 
market condition; IVOL is the n-day difference of the option-implied volatility of 
Hang Seng Index to proxy the Hong Kong stock market conditions; and TED is the n-day 
difference of the spread between 1-month HIBOR and 1-month Exchange Fund Bill yield 
to proxy the short term liquidity risk in the Hong Kong dollar.  These risk factors in the 
quantile regression are used to help control for the market and economic conditions other 
than the shock from bank j. 
 
  In the quantile regression, the coefficients can be estimated by the 




0) ( ε ε , and  0 ≤ ε I  is an indicator 
function which equals one if  0
| ≤
j i
q ε  and zero otherwise. After estimating coefficients 
                                                 
9  Specifically, the n-day return of the equity price of bank j is log (Pt+n/Pt) where Pt is the equity price of 
bank j on day t.   - 7 -
(β ˆ s) of the quantile regression, the 
j i
q CoVaR
|  can be obtained by substituting  β ˆ s into 
the following equation:     
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  The values of the common risk factors (i.e. 
SPF R , IVOL , and TED) are 
those on the date when 
j
q VaR  is observed. If the 
j
q VaR  is a return between two dates, 
the values of the common risk factors are linearly interpolated by the values realised on 






l q VaR VaR r rVaR = − + , , ) 1 (  where 
j
l q VaR ,  (and 
j
u q VaR , ) is the realised return of bank j 
just smaller (and larger) than 
j
q VaR . 
 
 The  CoVaR method can also be used to evaluate which banks are more at 
risk when the common risk factors are stressed. The corresponding measures can be 
estimated by 
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, | , 
IVOL j i
q CoVaR
, | , and 
TED j i
q CoVaR
, |  are VaRs conditional on 
SPF R , 
IVOL and TED at their VaR levels respectively; and 
SPF
q VaR , 
IVOL
q VaR  and 
TED
q VaR  are 
unconditional VaRs of 
SPF R , IVOL and TED respectively. 
 
  The absolute level of CoVaR reveals the vulnerability of a bank when 
another bank is in distress.  In other words, the larger the estimated CoVaR (in absolute 
term) of a bank, the larger spillover effect is.  Apart from the measure in absolute level, 
an excess of the CoVaR over the VaR is also derived to examine the responsiveness of a 
bank to another distressed bank: 







q VaR CoVaR CoVaR − = Δ
| | . (7) 
 
If banks’ risks are significantly interdependent,ΔCoVaR will be different from zero. 






  Twelve banks that are listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and have 
substantial business in Hong Kong are selected in this analysis.    These banks are grouped 
into (1) international banks; (2) local banks; and (3) Mainland banks, according to the 
business coverage of the banks and the countries where their parent companies are 
incorporated in. 
 
  The estimation uses daily information for the period from 4 January 2006 
to 22 May 2009.
10  This sample period is selected because it covers the distress period 
during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.    To be consistent with the market practice 
in calculating banks’ market risk, we examine a 10-day return of banks’ equity prices and 
the maximum loss of the prices at 99% confidence level.  In other words, n is set as 10 
and q is set as 1%. 
 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 The  CoVaR and  CoVaR Δ  of the three bank groups are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Bank group listed in the first row of the tables are the 
“source” of stress. Each cell in Table 1 represents the CoVaR of the bank listed in the first 
column at the 99th percentile conditional upon the VaR of another bank at the 99th 
percentile.  Similarly, each cell in Table 2 represents the excess of CoVaR over VaR 
( CoVaR Δ ) of the bank listed in the first column at the 99th percentile conditional upon 
another bank being in distress.  For instance, when a Mainland bank comes under stress 
                                                 
10  Due to data availability, the sample period starts from 4 January 2006.    The data used are obtained from 
Bloomberg.   - 9 -
(depicted by having its VaR of its equity value at the 99th percentile), an international 
bank’s VaR at the 99th percentile increases by 10.6 percentage points on average 
compared with its unconditional VaR.  This is not necessarily symmetric. In case an 
international bank is in trouble, a Mainland bank’s VaR at the 99th percentile only rises by 
8 percentage points.   
 
The main findings of the empirical results are summarised as follows: 
 
(i)  Table 1 shows that the expected maximum losses in equity value of banks 
(as reflected by averages of banks’CoVaRs) are significantly larger than 
their corresponding VaR estimates as shown in the last column.  Table 2 
demonstrates that the expected maximum loss in a bank’s equity value 
increases by about 10.1 percentage points on average when another bank is 
in distress, revealing that banks in Hong Kong were generally 
interconnected with each other during the sample period.   
 
(ii)  The extent of risk interdependence among banks is found to be the highest 
for local banks, followed by international banks and Mainland banks. Chart 
1 shows that when a bank suffers from an extreme equity loss, the expected 
maximum losses in equity value in a 10-day horizon of local banks, on 
average, would increase by 11.3% to 43.4%, and that of international banks 
would increase by 10.8% to 38.9%. For Mainland banks, the expected 
maximum loss would increase by 8.1% to 35.7%. 
 
(iii)  Chart 2 indicates that different groups of banks being in distress affect the 
extent of risk interdependence differently.    When a local bank is in distress, 
it would on average increase other banks’ expected maximum losses by 
11.8%.  The effects due to a distressed international bank and a 
distressed Mainland bank are estimated to be 9.4% and 8.5% respectively.  
This suggests that although local banks are generally smaller in size, their 
systemic importance is found to be similar to or even greater than their 
international and Mainland counterparts. 
   - 10 -
(iv)  Chart 3 shows the average  CoVaR Δ s of the three bank groups conditional 
on changes in the common risk factors including the US equity market 
performance, funding liquidity in the Hong Kong dollar and local stock 
market condition (represented by 
SPF R ,  TED and IVOL respectively).  
The estimation results show that the expected maximum losses in equity 
value of local banks are more responsive to the funding liquidity risk, while 
those of international banks is more responsive to a sharp fall in the US 
equity prices.  When TED is stressed at its 99% VaR, the VaR of local 
banks is estimated to increase by 7.6 percentage points to 39.7% on average. 
When 
SPF R  is stressed at its 99% VaR, the VaR of international banks 




  This paper measures the risks of different bank groups in Hong Kong by 
employing the  CoVaR  method to take account of banks’ interdependence under extreme 
conditions based on their equity prices.  The empirical results suggest that, similar to 
other banking systems, there is significant risk interdependence among banks in the Hong 
Kong banking sector. More importantly, although local banks are generally smaller in size, 
their systemic importance measured by the CoVaR is found to be similar to their 
international and Mainland counterparts, which may be due to a higher degree of 
commonality in the risk profile of local banks. Regarding the impact of external shocks on 
the three bank groups, international banks are more likely to be affected by the equity 
price fall in the US market, while local banks are relatively more responsive to the risk 
factor of funding liquidity in the Hong Kong dollar. 
 
The study shows that the CoVaR is a useful indicator of measuring the 
extent of risk interdependence among banks and identifying systemically important banks, 






Table 1.    CoVaR for the Crisis Period from 4 January 2006 to 22 May 2009 
Source of stress  Row average 
(Vulnerability)  Bank at risk under 
the following 
bank group  International  Mainland  Local All  Groups 
Average 
VaR 
  Min  Max Average Min  Max  Average Min Max Average Min Max Average  
International  0.276 0.467  0.375 0.263  0.554 0.387 0.273    0.526 0.396 0.263  0.554  0.389  0.281 
Mainland  0.265 0.429  0.356 0.284  0.391 0.335 0.274    0.488 0.370 0.265  0.488  0.357  0.276 




0.258 0.546  0.391 0.263  0.571 0.383 0.273    0.668 0.411 0.258  0.668  0.397  0.296 
Note: A positive figure indicates a loss in equity return 
 
 
Table 2.    CoVaR Δ   for the Crisis Period from 4 January 2006 to 22 May 2009 
Source of stress  Row average 
(Vulnerability)  Bank at risk under 
the following 
bank group  International  Mainland  Local All  Groups 
  Min Max  Average Min  Max  Average  Min  Max Average Min  Max Average
International  0.030 0.198  0.094 0.017 0.284  0.106    -0.020  0.257  0.115 -0.020  0.284  0.108 
Mainland  -0.004 0.164  0.080 -0.024  0.124 0.059    0.007  0.221 0.094 -0.024  0.221 0.081 
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Chart 2.    Increases in the expected maximum losses in equity value of other banks given a bank being in distress 
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